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Whistleblowers could facilitate the regulation of the 
environmental sector at little to no cost to the taxpayer. Often, 
potential whistleblowers have timely access to information that 
would enable them to avert or minimize environmental damage 
and to protect our communities. However, existing federal and 
state regulations fail to adequately protect environmental 
whistleblowers and to incentivize potential environmental 
whistleblowers. These failures unjustly penalize whistleblowers 
and discourage potential whistleblowers. This article uses 
research findings and a case study to illuminate these failings 
and to argue for reforms that would better protect and incentivize 
whistleblowers. 
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 The film Erin Brockovich tells the true story of a 
whistleblower who “brought a town to its feet and a corporation 
to its knees” by fighting against the Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company—and winning.1 In the final scene, Brockovich struts 
into her brand new office, and her boss hands her a bonus check 
for $2 million dollars.2 The audience leaves the film with the 
sense that the hero did the right thing and got rewarded for it. 
Though an inspiring tale, this film plays into the myth that if a 
whistleblower has "the goods on the folks that are doing wrong” 
then he or she “almost always succeeds.”3 In reality, the typical 
whistleblower is “brutalized the entire way.”4 One study of 
whistleblowers found that after blowing the whistle: “82% [of 
whistleblowers] experienced harassment, 60% were fired, 17% 
                                                        
* J.D. cum laude, Harvard Law School 
(ebecker@jd14.law.harvard.edu). I am grateful to Fardin Oliaei for sharing her 
experience and insights on this topic and to Richard Lazarus and Caleb Griffin 
for their support during the research and drafting process. 
1. A.O. Scott, Erin Brockovich: High Ideals, Higher Heels, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/movie/review?res=9805eed8163af934a25750c0a9669c8
b63 (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
2. ERIN BROCKOVICH (Universal Pictures 2000). 
3. Eugene Russo, The Plight of the Environmental Whistleblower, 
THE SCIENTIST ONLINE (Jan. 17, 2005), http://www.the-
scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/16170/title/The-Plight-of-the-
Whistleblower (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 




lost their homes, and 10% admitted to [having] attempted 
suicide”—a far cry from a swank office and a big check.5  
This paper analyzes existing legal approaches to 
environmental whistleblowers and concludes that existing laws 
do not adequately protect whistleblowers and do not provide 
sufficient incentives for potential whistleblowers.6 Specifically, 
the weaknesses in federal and state statutes addressing 
environmental whistleblowing include: (1) relying on an anti-
retaliatory model rather than an incentives-based model and (2) 
using an overly limited definition of whistleblowing that excludes 
(a) whistleblowers who report violations of “scientific integrity” 
and (b) whistleblowers who disclose to the media or to their 
supervisors.7 The federal approach falls short by (3) providing an 
overly short statute of limitations.8 Most state approaches fail by 
(4) offering whistleblowers insufficient remedies, including (a) not 
penalizing supervisors who engage in retaliatory practices and (b) 
failing to protect whistleblowers from blacklisting and/or 
employment instability following their disclosures.9 
The purposes of this paper are to: (1) outline the benefits 
of whistleblowing, (2) provide an example of a real-life 
whistleblower, (3) examine the limitations of existing approaches 
to protecting environmental whistleblowers, and (4) recommend 
changes to these approaches. The scope of this paper is restricted 
to the legal protections available to environmental whistleblowers 
in the United States under federal and state statutory schemes. 
The Part II defines whistleblowing, examines the contributions 
made by whistleblowers, analyzes the current status of 
                                                        
5. Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: 
Defending A More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1633, 1655 (2008). 
6. See infra notes 178–Error! Bookmark not defined. (stating 
that the existing whistleblowing regulation scheme requires statutory changes 
that would provide more persuasive incentives and stronger protections).  
7. See infra notes 130–166 (discussing the shortcomings of failing 
to provide incentives to whistleblowers and also difficulties created by overly 
narrow definitions of whistleblowing in both state and federal law). 
8.  See infra notes 173–177 (stating that a longer statute of 
limitations would provide whistleblowers more time to evaluate reporting 
options and take opportunities to protect themselves). 
9.  See infra notes 169–Error! Bookmark not defined. 
(outlining the failure of state whistleblowing statutes to adequately deter 
supervisors from punishing whistleblowers).  




whistleblowers, and explores the role of whistleblowers in the 
environmental context.10 Part III describes the experiences of 
environmental whistleblower Fardin Oliaei, former Senior 
Research Scientist and Coordinator of the Emerging 
Contaminants Program at the Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency (MPCA).11 Part IV reviews existing laws applicable to 
environmental whistleblowers and suggests changes to those 
laws.12  
 
II. Whistleblowing and Environmental Disputes 
 
Who keeps Americans safe from corporate and industrial 
wrongdoing? Is it government agencies charged with protecting 
the public? Is it auditors responsible for monitoring industries? Is 
it media personnel hunting for a good story? Is it insiders who 
risk their jobs to protect the public? While all of these entities 
play a role in detecting wrongdoing, recent research suggests that 
nontraditional actors like the media and industry employees play 
a greater role than government regulators.13 This section sheds 
light on what a whistleblower is and how whistleblowers help 
keep the public safe.14 It begins by defining whistleblowers.15 It 
then explores the main types of whistleblowers and their 
motivations.16 Next, it examines the importance of whistleblowers 
within the United States.17 The fourth subsection analyzes the 
                                                        
10. See infra Part II (describing whistleblowing in environmental 
law and its benefits). 
11. See infra Part III (illustrating the difficulties presented to 
whistleblowers by analyzing Fardin Oliaei’s experiences in this role).  
12. See infra Part IV (suggesting reforms to federal and various 
state laws that would improve reporting and enforcement).  
13. See I.J. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, & Luigi Zingales, Who 
Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2226 (2010) (identifying 
the media as a key player in corporate governance by exposing improper 
activities). 
14. See infra Part II (stating the benefits created by 
whistleblowing, such as increased industry accountability).  
15. See infra Part II(A) (providing a standard definition of 
whistleblowing).  
16. See infra Part II(B) (analyzing the various actors who typically 
act as whistleblowers, such as auditors and journalists). 
17. See infra Part II(C) (describing the benefits created by 




consequences of whistleblowing for an individual whistleblower. 
The final subsection explores the unique challenges faced by 
environmental whistleblowers.18  
 
A. Defining Whistleblowing 
 
The term “whistleblower” finds its roots in an old practice 
of the English police officers, who would blow a whistle to alert 
other officers and the public that a crime was being committed 
nearby. 19 The term has evolved and today generally refers to a 
member of an organization who takes steps to inform others of 
ethical or legal violations that are being or have been committed 
by or within that organization.20 There is no consensus on the 
precise definition of a whistleblower, with sources disagreeing 
over: (1) what type of “wrong” (from improprieties to immoral 
conduct to concrete violations of law) may be reported by a 
whistleblower; (2) whether a whistleblower must act in good 
faith; and (3) whether a whistleblower ought to report misconduct 
to a supervisor, a government agency, the media or some 
combination of these outlets.21 In this paper, the term 
“whistleblower” refers to an individual who reports actual or 
potential misconduct (inclusive of violations of “scientific 
integrity”) within a government agency or company that poses a 
real or potential threat to the public interest.22 Part IV(3) 
examines the benefits of incorporating a more expansive 
                                                        
18. See infra Part II(D) (listing the many dangers deterring 
potential whistleblowers, such as employment retaliation and blacklisting). 
19. See Winters v. Houston Chronicle Pub., 795 S.W.2d 723, 727 
(Tex. 1990) (noting that “[t]he term is derived from the act of an English bobby 
blowing his whistle upon becoming aware of the commission of a crime to alert 
other law enforcement officers and the public within the zone of danger”). 
20. See Peter D. Banick, Case Note: The "In-House" Whistleblower: 
Walking the Line Between “Good Cop, Bad Cop”, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1868, 
1873 (2011) (stating that whistleblowers are “employees who . . . with a 
reasonable belief that their assertions are accurate, report, disclose, or 
otherwise make known to parties internal or external to the organization any 
violation of law by their employers . . . for the purpose of exposing such 
wrongdoing”). 
21.  See id. at 1872–73 nn.20–21, 23 (outlining various areas of 
disagreement over the definition of “whistleblowing”). 
22. See infra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (incorporating 
violations of “scientific integrity” into the definition of whistleblowing) 




definition of whistleblowing into existing laws.23  
 
B. Who Detects Wrongdoing? 
 
 Many people assume that auditors and regulators are paid 
to detect fraud in most instances.24 However, a recent study 
found that nontraditional whistleblowers actually detected more 
fraud than these traditional actors.25 Whistleblowers, including 
employees of organizations committing fraud and media 
personnel, exposed 30% of the fraud cases studied.26 Auditors, on 
the other hand, detected only 10% of fraud cases, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) detected just 7% of 
fraud cases. 27 The numbers are even starker in the healthcare 
industry, with whistleblowers responsible for detecting 41% of 
fraud cases in that sector.28 These figures underscore the 
important role that whistleblowers play in protecting the public. 
Though the extent of whistleblowers’ contribution to fraud 
detection is initially surprising, a deeper analysis of incentives 
and differential access to information helps explain why so many 
employees and members of the media become whistleblowers.29 
The first group—employees of organizations engaging in 
wrongdoing—has easy, low-cost access to information as a 
natural byproduct of working inside the organization.30 Many 
                                                        
23. See infra Part IV(B) (describing the benefits of expanding the 
definition of whistleblowing so that many different actors are protected).  
24. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding 
Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 323 (2007) (noting that “a growing 
body of literature addresses paying rewards to effective capital market 
gatekeepers”). 
25. See Dyck et al., supra note 13, at 2224–26 (concluding that a 
substantial amount of whistleblowing is conducted by actors that did not 
traditionally embody reporting roles). 
26. See id. at 2214 (finding that media personnel account for 13% 
of reporting and employees account for 17%). 
27.  See id. (stating that individuals in primarily financial and 
legal roles do not engage in a substantial amount of total reporting). 
28. See id. at 2215 (finding that 41% of reported frauds in the 
health care industry are exposed by employees).  
29. See id. at 2214–15 (noting that traditional discussions of 
whistleblowing “ignore differences in the costs of identifying and gathering 
fraud-relevant information”).  
30. See id at 2214 (explaining that “[e]mployees, industry 





employees also blow the whistle in order to avoid personal 
liability for fraud being committed within their organization.31 
Positive monetary incentives, such as those offered by qui tam 
suits that give whistleblowers a portion of the proceeds of fraud 
detection, also motivate employees to become whistleblowers.32 In 
fact, positive monetary incentives substantially increase the 
likelihood that an individual employee will blow the whistle on 
his or her employer.33 Unfortunately, financial incentives exist in 
a limited number of sectors, including the healthcare sector 
where whistleblowers detect 41% of fraud cases, but largely 
excluding the environmental sector.34 Part IV(B)(1) examines the 
benefits of providing monetary incentives to encourage potential 
whistleblowers in the environmental sector to go public.35 
The second group—media personnel—has a positive 
reputational incentive to expose fraud because it makes a 
compelling news story.36 Unlike the incentives for employees, 
journalists’ reputational incentive increases as the size of the 
fraud increases.37 Indeed, value-weighting the data on fraud 
cases to reflect the amount of money involved increases the 
distribution of the media’s role in fraud detection from 13% to 
24%, but has no effect on the distribution of employee’s role in 
fraud detection.38  
                                                                                                                                
their normal work”).  
31. See id. at 2216 (stating that “[f]or many employee 
whistleblowers the more important benefit is avoiding the potential legal 
liability that arises from being involved in the fraud”). 
32. See id. at 2214–16 (discussing the incentives created by giving 
those who bring information a large percentage of the money recovered as a 
result).  
33. See id. at 2215–16 (concluding that “[m]onetary incentives for 
fraud revelation appear to play a role regardless of the severity of the fraud”). 
34. See id. (noting that “in health care (an industry where suits 
are more likely to provide a financial reward for whistleblowers because 
government’s procurements account for a significant percentage of revenues) 
41% of frauds are brought to light by employees”). 
35. See infra Part IV(B)(1).  
36. See id. at 2214 (describing the reputational incentive behind 
exposing fraud).  
37. See id. (explaining that “[a] journalist who uncovers a fraud 
receives national attention, which increases his career opportunities”).  
38. See id. (finding that “[v]alue-weighting creates only one change 
in the distribution: the media become much more important (24%), suggesting 
they mainly get involved in the biggest cases”). 




Interestingly, both employees and media personnel report 
a surprising percent of fraud cases despite having relatively low 
financial incentives when compared to the resources spent on 
official monitors like auditors and regulators.39 This suggests that 
increasing incentives for employees and media personnel might 
be more cost-effective than increasing spending on official 
monitors.40  
 
C. Importance of Whistleblowers 
 
Employees and media personnel that blow the whistle 
help identify wrongdoing that might never be detected by 
auditors or regulators.41 Even in cases where the wrongdoing 
would eventually become known, whistleblowers often help 
identify the misconduct early. 42  By doing so, they reduce the cost 
of subsequent investigations and ensure that the fraud has a 
smaller impact than it would have had otherwise.43 Moreover, the 
very presence of potential whistleblowers in a workplace likely 
deters misconduct from ever occurring.44  
Whistleblower’s contributions are not only descriptively 
good; they are also quantifiably valuable. As of 2007, “60 percent 
of the Department of Justice's cases of fraud against the federal 
government were initiated by whistleblowers, resulting in 
recovery of over $20 billion for the taxpayers.”45 Whistleblower 
                                                        
39.  See id. (stating that “actors, who do not own any residual claim 
in the firms involved and are often not considered important players in the 
corporate governance arena, play a key role in fraud detection”). 
40.  See id. at 2251 (concluding that monetary rewards should be 
increased in order to incentivize whistleblowing from individuals who can easily 
access and divulge information).  
41 See Dolan v. Cont'l Airlines, 563 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Mich. 1997) 
(noting that “[w]ithout employees who are willing to risk adverse employment 
consequences as a result of whistleblowing activities, the public would remain 
unaware of large-scale and potentially dangerous abuses”). 
42. See Sinzdak, supra note 5, at 1635 (observing that employees 
“can alert employers to problems before those problems escalate”). 
43. See id. at 1636 (finding that “information provided by 
whistleblowers can substantially reduce the cost to the public of detection and 
investigation of wrongdoing or corruption”). 
44. See id. at 1635–36 (observing that “[t]he presence of 
whistleblowers may also help deter misconduct in the first instance”). 





claims against the pharmaceutical industry recovered $12 billion 
from 2001 to 2011.46 
 
D. Status of Whistleblowers 
 
 Despite the importance of contributions made by 
whistleblowers, whistleblowers often suffer severe consequences 
for their actions.47 The study cited in the beginning of this 
Article—finding that 82% of whistleblowers experienced 
harassment, 60% were fired, 17% lost their homes, and 10% 
admitted to attempted suicides—is not alone in highlighting the 
negative consequences whistleblowers face.48 Other negative 
consequences include being blacklisted from future employers, 
facing social ostracism from coworkers, and experiencing 
psychological strain.49 Many whistleblowers report that, “[i]f I 
had to do it over again, I wouldn’t.”50 Perhaps it is not surprising 
that whistleblowers are rare, representing less than two percent 
of all employees.51 It is likely that many people do not even 
consider blowing the whistle because of fear of reprisals.52 The 
                                                                                                                                
Critiquing Federal Whistleblower Laws and Recommending Filling in Missing 
Pieces to Form A Beautiful Patchwork Quilt, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2011). 
46. See id. (identifying the large amounts of money available to 
whistleblowers via high-profile qui tam claims). 
47.  See Sinzdak, supra note 5, at 1655 (stating that “employees 
cannot necessarily assume that their employer is ready and willing to solve 
problems brought to its attention”).  
48. See id. (citing the large number of whistleblowers who are 
negatively affected by reporting fraud). 
49.  See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: 
Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud 
Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 95–96 (2007) (describing the breadth of 
negative consequences that whistleblowers face after reporting). 
50. Dyck, supra note 13, at 2216. 
51. See Laura Simoff, Comment, Confusion and Deterrence: The 
Problems That Arise from A Deficiency in Uniform Laws and Procedures for 
Environmental "Whistleblowers", 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 325, 327 (1999). 
52. See Mary Rowe & Corinne Bendersky, Workplace Justice, Zero 
Tolerance and Zero Barriers, in NEGOTIATIONS AND CHANGE, FROM THE 
WORKPLACE TO SOCIETY (Thomas Kochan and Richard Locke eds., 2002), 
available at http://ombud.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/zero_zero.pdf 
(explaining that “the organizational culture, if it is hierarchical and oriented 
toward punishment, may, ironically, inhibit willingness to act or to come 
forward”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  




backlash faced by whistleblowers suggests that existing 
protections under the law are insufficient,53 that our legal regime 
offers insufficient incentives for potential whistleblowers, or a 
combination of both. 54  
 
E. Environmental Whistleblowers 
 
Though regulating any industry is difficult, regulating the 
environmental industry poses unique challenges.55 
Whistleblowers are important in all sectors, but whistleblowers 
play a crucial role in the environmental sector.56 Though all 
whistleblowers face obstacles, there is a particular subset of 
challenges that many whistleblowers in the environmental sector 
must face.57 This subsection explains: (1) the challenges of 
regulating the environmental sector,58 (2) the potential for 
                                                        
53. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, OSHA FACT SHEET: YOUR RIGHTS AS A WHISTLEBLOWER (2013), available 
at https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/whistleblower_rights.pdf 
(providing that an employee can file a complaint with OSHA if an employer 
retaliates against the employee for whistleblowing while working in certain 
“protected activities”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
54. See OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. 
COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2013.pdf (explaining that it 
can be inferred that the relatively small growth in the number of whistleblowers 
reported indicates that the Act has not provided a significant incentive to report 
misconduct) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
55. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY INFORMATION BY 
SECTOR (2014) (“Most business sectors are affected by a number of major 
environmental statutes and regulations.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
56. See Theo Emery, With Tips From Whistle-Blowers, More 
Hands on Deck in Pollution Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, at A11, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/us/whistle-blowers-help-us-fight-ocean-
dumping.html?_r=0 (explaining that without whistleblowers it would be nearly 
impossible to stop pollution dumpers) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
57. See id. (explaining that the working environment on ships does 
not allow for a worker to turn in their employer without some kind of safety 
net). 




whistleblowers to increase compliance with environmental 
regulations,59 and (3) the unique difficulties environmental 
whistleblowers face.60  
 
1. Challenges of Regulating the Environmental Sector 
The environmental sector is difficult to regulate because: 
(1) environmental dangers can be hard to monitor;61 (2) 
enforcement of environmental regulations tends to be costly and 
is often dependent upon industry self-reporting;62 (3) regulated 
entities often have a financial incentive not to comply with 
environmental laws;63 and (4) environmental harm is time-
sensitive and difficult to reverse.64 
Part of this difficulty enforcing environmental regulations 
comes from the very nature of environmental harms, which tend 
to be hard to detect and trace back to their source.65 Another 
challenge comes from the fact that emission levels may vary over 
space and time.66 A further challenge comes from the fact that 
many small polluters that are individually difficult to monitor 
can collectively pose a very real threat.67 These difficulties make 
                                                        
59. See infra Part II(E)(2). 
60. See infra Part II(E)(3). 
61. See NAT’L CENTER FOR ENVTL. ECON, U.S ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES, ch. 4 at 16 (2014) (hereinafter 
“PREPARING ECON. ANALYSES”) (explaining that the identification of a solution to 
different environmental problems depends on how difficult the source of the 
problem is to pinpoint) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
62. See id. at 2 (“All efficient policies are cost-effective, but it is not 
necessarily true that all cost-effective policies are efficient.”) 
63. See Jonathan S. Shefftz, EPA’s Economic Benefit Analysis 
Policy and Practice, 19 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 74, 74 (2004) (illustrating that there 
are “financial incentives” for the facility to avoid compliance). 
64. See PREPARING ECON. ANALYSES supra note 61, ch. 4 at 2 (2014) 
(describing that pollution levels can vary over time and the resulting damages 
can vary by location). 
65. See id. at 15 (explaining that identifying a solution to different 
environmental problems depends on how difficult the source of the problem is to 
pinpoint). 
66. See id. at 16 (indicating that one question to ask when 
assessing the solution to an environmental problem is whether the pollutant 
varies across time and space).  
67. See E. Somanathan & Thomas Sterner, Environmental Policy 
Instruments and Institutions in Developing Countries, in ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL STABILITY: NEW POLICY OPTIONS 238 (Ramón 
 




environmental controls highly technical, posing another 
challenge: Regulators must have expertise and access to high-
tech tools to establish effective pollution regulation controls based 
on the type of pollutant. 68  
Because of the challenges of enforcing environmental 
regulations, government-regulated monitoring efforts are 
expensive.69 In an effort to reduce the cost of enforcement, some 
regulatory approaches, such as subsidies, deposit-refunded 
systems, and information disclosure, shift the burden of proof 
onto the regulated industry.70 Though less costly, these 
approaches make regulators dependent on industry self-reporting 
and create the potential for an industry to misreport its pollutant 
levels.71 The potential that self-reported data will be misreported 
or that industries will subvert official monitoring by engaging in 
illegal practices, such as tampering with monitoring equipment 
or dumping illegally, poses a serious threat because industries 
often profit from noncompliance.72 Under the theory of efficient 
breach, companies may be willing to break environmental laws 
                                                                                                                                
López & Michael A. Toman eds., 2006) (summarizing the problems posed by 
small polluters by explaining that “[i]t is the nature of such polluters that they 
are hard to regulate by several of the conventional instruments used for bigger 
industries”). 
68. See Robert W. Crandall, Pollution Controls, THE CONCISE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (Library of Economics and Liberty ed. 2008), 
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PollutionControls.html 
(“Because each pollutant has many sources, the EPA often sets literally 
hundreds of maximum-discharge standards for any single pollutant.”) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
69. See THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 207 
(Anthony Heyes ed. 2001) (explaining “government enforcement policy that 
requires a significant amount of monitoring expenditures” is the most practical 
option to regulate pollution, despite suggestions “to reduce the need for 
expensive government monitoring”). 
70. See id. at 208 (outlining alternative innovations to reduce the 
cost of government monitoring and the financial effects they may present). 
71. See id. at 207 (“One innovation is to require firms to self-report 
any violation of pollution standards. Voluntary reporting is rewarded with more 
lenient treatment.”). 
72. See John Livernois & C. J. McKenna, Truth or Consequences: 
Enforcing Pollution Standards with Self-Reporting, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 415, 415 
(1998) (“Theory suggests that firms comply with pollution laws when the cost of 





where noncompliance is less costly than compliance because 
regulations go under-enforced.73  
Not only are environmental harms hard to monitor, costly 
to regulate, and susceptible to “efficient breach,” environmental 
harms are also time-sensitive.74 Indeed, environmental harms 
jeopardize public health, and the longer harms continue, the 
greater health risk these harms pose.75 Moreover, it is usually far 
easier to prevent an environmental harm than to clean up after 
one; some environmental harms are effectively irreversible.76 
Thus, regulators often need to act quickly to be effective. 
 
2. Whistleblowers Can Facilitate Regulation of the 
Environmental Sector 
 
Whistleblowers can help regulators overcome the 
aforementioned challenges. First, whistleblowers that work as 
employees of regulated industries have the technical skills and 
knowledge that make them effective internal monitors.77 
Moreover, whistleblowers increase compliance with little or no 
additional cost to the taxpayer because they are private citizens 
rather than official monitors.78 By increasing “the likelihood that 
                                                        
73. See id. (suggesting that firms comply with regulations only 
when the resulting penalty for noncompliance will cost them more than 
implementing the changes would). 
74. See United States v. State Dep’t of Transp., No. C05–5447RJB, 
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75. See Gerard Hoek et al., Long-Term Air Pollution Exposure and 
Cardio-Respiratory Mortality: A Review, 12 ENVTL. HEALTH, no. 43, 2013, at 1 
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76. See PREPARING ECON. ANALYSES, supra note 61, at 4–19 
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77. See Hesch, supra note 45, at 53 (relaying the anecdote of 
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polluters will be penalized,” 79 whistleblowers can quell the 
danger of efficient breach by helping to ensure that 
noncompliance is more costly than compliance.80 Finally, internal 
whistleblowers often learn of violations as they are happening 
and can act quickly to contain or even prevent a time-sensitive 
environmental harm.81 Likewise, whistleblowers in the media can 
write a quick article that alerts community members of potential 
threats before regulators have time to act.82 In these ways, 
environmental whistleblowers have the potential to increase 
compliance with environmental laws. 
 
3. Challenges Faced by Environmental Whistleblowers 
 
Despite the need for whistleblowers in the environmental 
sector and the financial savings they can provide, several features 
of the environmental sector make being an whistleblower 
especially challenging.83 One problem is that most definitions of 
who is considered a “whistleblower” cover only individuals who 
report on traditional types of misconduct, such as waste, fraud, 
abuse of authority, and actions that pose an imminent threat to 
public health and safety.84 However, potential environmental 
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whistleblowers often encounter wrongdoing not covered by 
protective statutes, such as the suppression of results of 
emissions analyses and the use of skewed methodologies or 
inferior data.85 Relatedly, because scientific findings can be 
uncertain and contentious, potential environmental 
whistleblowers may be unclear as to whether they can or should 
publish controversial work in journals or newspapers.86 
Second, the environmental sector has what is known as a 
“revolving door” problem, a phrase that describes how individuals 
often work both as regulators and as employees of regulated 
industries during their career.87 Though there is a benefit to 
having experience in both sectors, often “revolving-door officials 
develop or direct policies that benefit a former or prospective 
employer.”88 Even those that do not actively attempt to benefit an 
employer may be unduly cautious in what they are willing to say 
or do because they are concerned about their job prospects.89  
Third, while whistleblowers in other industries may be 
able to stop wrongdoing by reporting internally, it is much more 
difficult for environmental whistleblowers to rely on internal 
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88. Id. at 3.  
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Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), in Cambridge, Mass. (Oct. 20, 
2012) (recounting her experience as an environmental whistleblower). 




reporting alone. This is because unlike other types of wrongdoing, 
environmental wrongdoing often has adverse effects on third 
parties and often creates lingering harms. 90 Thus, environmental 
whistleblowers that report internally may inadvertently enable 
their employers to avoid compensating third-party victims or to 
avoid paying the costs of environmental cleanup.91  To ensure 
that the situation is fully remedied, environmental 
whistleblowers therefore often need to report externally or 
otherwise publicize the wrongdoing.92 
Finally, because so many people encounter chemicals and 
pollutants at different stages, environmental whistleblowers 
come from many different backgrounds.93 They can be employees 
involved with cleanup of environmental hazards, individuals 
responsible for storing and disposing of solvents, factory workers, 
concerned scientists, regulators who feel their work is being 
silenced, media personnel who learn about contamination from a 
variety of sources, and others.94 In fact, whistleblower protections 
from environmental laws have been applied to: “a painter who 
cooperated with an investigation into toxic dumping, a teacher 
who complained about asbestos in a school house, an engineer 
who filed reports regarding a shipyard’s noncompliance with 
hazardous waste regulations, and an employee who told a 
newspaper reporter about the discharge of sludge into the Cedar 
Rapids.”95 With environmental whistleblowers found in many 
different sectors, it is difficult to ensure that potential 
whistleblowers know about applicable laws, including the 
protections available, the procedure for reporting, and the 
timeline for the relevant statute of limitations.96  
                                                        
90. See Sinzdak, supra at note 5, 1651 (highlighting the potential 
long term problems).  
91. See id. at 1652 (noting the residual effects of internal 
reporting). 
92. See id. at 1661 (suggesting a solution to an internal reporting 
problem).  
93. See Richard E. Condit, Providing Environmental 
Whistleblowers with Twenty-First Century Protections, 2 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 
31, 33 (2011) (describing the types of people who typically file whistleblowing 
reports).  
94. See id. (providing examples of whistleblowers). 
95. William Sanjour and Stephen M. Kohn, Environmental 
Whistleblowers: An Endangered Species, ENVTL. RESEARCH FOUND. (Feb. 1994). 






III. Fardin Oliaei: A Case Study in Environmental 
Whistleblower Laws 
 
In 2000, Fardin Oliaei was working as a Senior Research 
Scientist and Coordinator of the Emerging Contaminants 
Program at the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA).97 
Her job was to investigate the dangers posed by emerging 
contaminants (a term for any artificial or naturally-occurring 
chemical that is not typically monitored but has the potential to 
enter the environment and pose a danger to the environment or 
human health).98 Oliaei was one of the first scientists in the state 
to express concern about the environmental and health risks 
posed by perfluorinated chemicals (PFCs), “a family of synthetic 
compounds that 3M manufactured for use in waterproofing 
agents, non-stick cookware, fire-fighting foam, and food 
packaging.”99  She found that PFC contamination had spread 
throughout the state, with the chemicals turning up everywhere 
from fish in Voyageur’s National park to drinking water in 
communities near 3M waste disposal sites.100  
Human exposure to PFCs has been linked with cancer, 
thyroid problems, and liver damage, but the link is not 
necessarily causal.101 Though the long-term effects of exposure to 
PFCs on human health are uncertain, scientists worry because 
PFCs “accumulate in living tissue and take a long time to break 
down.”102 A former 3M chemist described one common form of 
PFC, perfluorooctane sulfonate or PFOS, as one of the “most 
insidious pollutants” of recent times in part because it does not 
degrade, is highly toxic to wildlife, and its environmental sink 
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appears to be biota rather than soil or sediment.103 Because of the 
extent of the contamination, the length of time it takes PFCs to 
break down, and the scientific uncertainty regarding their health 
effects, Oliaei considered PCFs to be a top priority for research.104 
 Despite the scientific basis for concern, Oliaei alleges that 
MPCA management deliberately deterred her from continuing to 
research the chemicals.105 In her words, “since Ms. [Sheryl] 
Corrigan left 3M to become MPCA Commissioner . . . MPCA top 
management . . . intentionally minimized the environmental 
monitoring of PFCs in Minnesota.”106 When Oliaei publicized her 
findings on Minnesota Public Radio, top management disciplined 
her and threatened to fire her if she continued to speak out about 
the issue.107 She explains that the pressure to be silent was so 
great that “PFC was a forbidden word. During my last three 
years at the agency, the managers told me, ‘Fardin, don’t mention 
PFC or you will lose your job.’”108  
Ultimately, Oliaei resigned from MPCA and pursued a 
lawsuit citing violations of the First Amendment, federal civil 
rights statutes, and the Minnesota Human Rights and 
Whistleblower Acts.109 After her resignation, Oliaei received a 
settlement of $325,000 (or three years of her salary), but that 
money quickly dwindled.110 As of 2012, she has been unable to 
find employment in her field, with several interviewers informing 
her that they had been pressured into not hiring her.111 Though 
Oliaei has been “constantly applying for jobs,” she now believes 
she was “naively optimistic” and that she has “been blacklisted 
from any possible job. 112 She reports that one potential employer 
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explained that they could not hire her because, “3M is a powerful 
company. They drew lines and you crossed them. Now you can 
never step back inside.”113 This employer encouraged Oliaei to 
leave the state to increase her chances of finding a job.114 
Eventually, she was forced to sell her prized possession—her 
home.115 “I hate to say it, but this is the reality: I’m homeless,” 
said Oliaei, who now lives with a friend out of state.116 “I lost 
everything. I left the agency with my 49 boxes of PFC research. 
When I sold the house, I let everything go at an estate sale for 
almost nothing—except for those boxes. I took those with me.”117  
Since her resignation, politicians, regulators, and 
scientists have become more aware of the dangers posed by PFCs 
and efforts have been made to clean up the contamination.118 
Many insiders attribute these changes to Oliaei’s work. State 
Senator John Marty, DFL-Roseville, said Oliaei’s efforts “made a 
big difference . . . [because] ‘I don’t think anyone was paying 
attention to PFCs before her.’”119 State Rep. Karen Clark, DFL-
Minneapolis, furthered, “[e]verything Fardin said when she 
testified to the Senate has proven to be true. It just took a couple 
of years to come out . . . I do think Fardin did us all a tremendous 
public service and she paid dearly.”120 Though Oliaei was not 
recognized for her work while at MPCA, her contributions have 
since been recognized.121 Rather than being disciplined, her 
supervisors, Paul Hoff and Marvin Hora, received recognition for 
Oliaei’s comprehensive research on PFC and were promoted.122  
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Oliaei’s experiences echo some of the obstacles facing 
environmental whistleblowers as discussed in Part II(E).  
Specifically, (1) the misconduct Oliaei made public constituted a 
violation of scientific integrity, involving the suppression of her 
research and an attempt to silence her; (2) part of the conflict 
between Oliaei and MPCA management involved a disagreement 
over her rights to publicize her research; (3) her supervisor, 
Commissioner Corrigan, previously worked for 3M (a producer of 
PFCs) and as such exemplifies the “revolving door” problem; and 
(4) the pollution involved impacts third parties and takes a long 
time to breakdown, meaning that simply preventing further 
contamination would not completely resolve the problem. Her 
experiences also highlight some of the challenges whistleblowers 
face after going public, including losing their jobs, losing their 
homes, having difficulty finding other work in the industry, and 
seeing those who suppressed their research go unpunished.  
 
IV. Analysis of Environmental Whistleblower Laws: Current 
Status, Limitations, and Suggested Reforms 
 
Though Fardin Oliaei’s story does not have a happy 
ending, there is hope that things can and will change. President 
Obama signed into law the Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), after it received the vote of 
every single member of the 112th Congress.123 Though this law 
only applies to federal employees and does not change the legal 
protections offered to most environmental whistleblowers, it 
significantly expands protections for the workers it does cover.124 
After the bill passed the House, Tom Devine, legal counsel for the 
Government Accountability Project, stated that the whistleblower 
rights in this bill are the strongest in history for federal 
workers.125 The unanimous passage of the law suggests that 
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American lawmakers value whistleblowers and are willing to 
take steps to ensure that they are protected. Rep. Darrell Issa (R-
Calif.) supported passage of the WPEA and he hoped that it “sent 
a clear message to those who help us protect the American people 
and their hard-earned tax dollars: [w]e stand beside you.”126 
Hopefully, lawmakers will send a similar message to 
environmental whistleblowers by expanding protections available 
to them. 
This Part analyzes the legal approaches to protecting 
environmental whistleblowers. It begins by providing an overview 
of the existing laws protecting environmental whistleblowers127. 
It then considers deficiencies in these laws and suggests ways to 
reform them.128 Where applicable, the section identifies portions 
of the WPEA and other laws that make reforms similar to those 
proposed here to demonstrate that the suggest reforms are both 




There are three main sources of law protecting 
environmental whistleblowers: federal environmental statutes 
providing for judicial relief, state whistleblower statutes, and 
state-level tort law.129 Because there often are applicable state or 
federal statutes and because the existence of a statutory remedy 
often precludes a common law cause of action for wrongful 
discharge, this paper focuses on the former two forms of 
protection. 
 
1. Federal Statutes 
 
From 1972 to 1980, Congress amended six environmental 
protection laws to include protections for environmental 
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whistleblowers.130 These six statutes include: the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”), 131 the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(“SDWA”),132 the Toxic Substance Control Act (“TSCA”),133 the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act (“SWDA”),134 the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”),135 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).136 These statutes 
seek to protect whistleblowers from employers who retaliate 
against them for speaking out against a potential violation.137 
Federal whistleblowing laws provide protections that are 
generally more favorable to the employee when compared to state 
whistleblower protections.138 These statutes have a very short 
statute of limitations that require whistleblowers to file 
violations with the Department of Labor (“DOL”) within thirty 
days.139 
Under the six federal statutes, the whistleblower must 
establish three elements of the prima facie case: (1) that their 
employer is covered by the act; (2) that the employee has engaged 
in protected activity under one of the acts; and (3) that the 
employee’s terms and conditions of employment have suffered as 
a consequence of engaging in the protected activity, with a 
showing of a discriminatory motive by a preponderance of the 
evidence.140 The employer can rebut a showing of discriminatory 
motive by giving legitimate business reasons for allegedly 
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retaliatory conduct.141 The employee then can demonstrate that 
the discriminatory motive would not have occurred in absence of 
whistleblowing activities.142 
The six federal statutes are extremely inclusive; any 
person in the private or public sector has the right to assert an 
anti-retaliation claim.143 Though broadly applicable to different 
actors, they only protect whistleblowers from retaliation against 
actions within the scope of the statute, such as filing formal 
complaints or providing official testimony.144 Types of 
discriminatory action covered by the statute include: termination, 
demotion, unfavorable references, rescinding of duties, and 
blacklisting of employees by the employer.145 It is relatively 
difficult to win one of these suits in court. An analysis of case 
decisions of the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of 
Administrative Law Judges shows that from 2000 through 2010 
only seventeen of 127 decided environmental whistleblower cases 
(slightly over thirteen percent) resulted in some type of relief for 
the employee.146  
 
2. State Statutes 
 
Every state and the District of Columbia have enacted 
some type of a whistleblower protection statute.147 However, state 
whistleblower statutes vary widely. Some of the major areas of 
difference include: the appropriate recipient of a whistleblower's 
report, the nature of the “wrongdoing” covered by the statute, and 
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the available remedies.148  
Because of this variation, it is difficult to speak of state 
whistleblower statutes as a whole. However, there are observable 
trends in state approaches. First, the vast majority of states rely 
exclusively on an anti-retaliation model to protect environmental 
whistleblowers as opposed to an incentives-based approach that 
would encourage whistleblowers to go public and to compensate 
them for doing so.149 In fact, all state statutes offer some sort of 
protection provision for employees who face employer retaliation 
while few offer an incentives-based approach.150 Secondly, most 
state statutes limit the definition of a whistleblower in similar 
ways.151 Only thirteen states protect disclosures to “to any person 
or organization, including public media,” and only two states 
cover “communication of scientific opinion or alteration of 
technical findings.”152 Thirdly, most state statutes have a 
consistent approach to remedies with respect to the fact that no 
states offer “transfer preference for prevailing whistleblower or 
ban on blackballing” and only 14 state statutes provide for 
“personnel actions against managers found to have retaliated.”153 
 
B. Deficiencies in Existing Approaches and Suggested 
Reforms 
 
 This section identifies deficiencies in existing laws 
regarding environmental whistleblowers, and it suggests ways 
that these laws could be reformed. Because many deficiencies 
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exist in both federal and state approaches, the deficiencies are 
divided by subject matter rather than by legal framework with an 
indication whether a given deficiency applies to both or only to 
one of the two statutory schemes.154  
 
1. Failure to Use an Incentives-Based Approach (Federal 
and State) 
 
Though all six federal statutes and the majority of state 
statutes rely on the anti-retaliation model, this approach does not 
provide incentives to encourage potential whistleblowers to go 
public.155 Research suggests that anti-retaliation statutes are far 
less successful at encouraging whistleblowers to go public than 
statutes that promise a financial reward.156 As mentioned above, 
whistleblowers in the healthcare sector (which employs an 
incentives based approach) report a greater percentage of fraud 
cases than in other sectors. 157 Moreover, adding an incentives 
component to existing approaches has been shown to increase the 
size and number of reports filed.158 For example, in 2006, the IRS 
issued a bounty program, Section 7623(b), which provided that 
whistleblowers would receive a 15–30% bounty of collected 
revenues if the IRS successfully recovered revenues based upon 
information brought to light by the whistleblower. 159 In just three 
years, reporting increased by over 100%—jumping from 2,751 
cases in 2007 to 5,678 cases in 2009.160 Moreover, while there 
were no IRS collections over $2 million between 2003 and 2006, 
there were fifteen collections over $2 million between 2007 and 
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2009.161 These figures suggest that offering a financial reward to 
environmental whistleblowers could dramatically increase the 
amount of wrongdoing detected.162  
The existing approach to environmental whistleblowers 
should be reformed by providing environmental whistleblowers 
whose reporting results in recovery of civil penalties or fines with 
a portion of the proceeds. The framework for providing funding 
for such an incentives program already exists.163 In 2010, the 
“EPA reported that it secured over $150 million in civil penalties 
and criminal fines and restitution.”164 Lawmakers could modify 
this system by offering a portion of the proceeds to whistleblowers 
that report a violation that results in such penalties or fines.165 
Statistics from other sectors suggest that doing so would increase 
the net recovery made by the EPA as well as the number of 
claims filed.166  
 Critics of the incentives-based model point out that 
financial incentives are not always possible in circumstances 
where the employer is small or the type of infraction committed 
does not net a substantial fine or civil penalty.167 Moreover, 
financial awards are not always appropriate or feasible in 
circumstances where whistleblowers identify violations of 
scientific integrity like the suppression of research or the use of 
inferior data.168 Thus, the incentives-based model would provide a 
supplement to but not a replacement for the anti-retaliatory 
model.169 A two-pronged approach would ensure that 
                                                        
161. See id. (providing data on IRS collections under section 
7623(b)). 
162. See id. (suggesting that financial incentives would increase 
environmental whistleblowing).  
163. See Condit, supra note 93, at 55 (explaining that a financial 
incentive program already exists under the Dodd-Frank Act).  
164. Id. 
165. See id. at 5556 (suggesting that there are alternatives for 
encouraging whistleblowing). 
166. See id (opining that more instances of environmental 
degradation might be detected if a financial incentive program was 
implemented). 
167. See Goodson, supra note 147, at 190 (explaining the limitations 
of financial incentive programs).  
168. See id. at 190–91 (indicating that financial incentives are not 
always appropriate)  
169. See id. at 19293 (suggesting that a standardized approach to 




whistleblowers in all circumstances are protected by the anti-
retaliatory model, but would provide incentives that would likely 
increase the number of whistleblowers who report on a certain 
class of infractions.  
 
2. Overly Limited Definition of Whistleblower (Federal and 
State) 
 
 The federal approach and the majority of state approaches 
rely on an overly limited definition of whistleblowers.170 
Specifically, the definition of a “whistleblower” used does not 
include those who blow the whistle by alerting news media or 
those who post online.171 The definition also does not include 
individuals that identify violations of the scientific method, such 
as suppression of data, use of skewed methodologies or use of 
inferior methods.172 
The limited definition of a whistleblower poses particular 
problems for environmental whistleblowers.173 First, as 
mentioned in Part II(E)(3) of this paper, environmental 
whistleblowers are spread throughout many sectors of the U.S. 
economy.174 Unlike potential whistleblowers from other sectors 
(like the federal government or the financial market), it is 
logistically difficult to ensure that potential whistleblowers know 
of the protections available to them.175 Second, the limited 
definition keeps environmental whistleblowers from alerting the 
media of the ongoing harm.176 Unlike time-consuming internal 
reporting mechanisms or external administrative remedies, 
                                                        
170. See generally Simoff, supra note 51 (describing how state and 
federal statutes differ regarding protection for whistleblowers).  
171. See Russo, supra note 3 (noting that whistleblower protection 
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172. See id. (explaining that whistleblower protection statutes do 
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173. See Hesch, supra note 45, at 82 (noting that whistleblower 
protections vary in the environmental sector).  
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176. See id. at 88 (indicating that the current statutes do not 
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turning to the media is a quick way for whistleblowers to inform 
a large number of third-party victims of the dangers posed by 
environmental damage.177 Finally, the failure to protect 
whistleblowers that identify violations of the scientific method 
excludes an important type of misconduct that poses a real 
danger to the public and ignores the reality facing whistleblowers 
in the science sector.178  
 The definition used should be reformed to include 
whistleblowers who make disclosures to the media and/or online, 
and whistleblowers who report violations of “scientific integrity. 
“The former change would give whistleblowers easier access to a 
wider audience and would protect those who speak to the media 
without understanding the nuances of relevant laws.179 The latter 
change would recognize the reality of the situation facing 
environmentalists and scientists who often witness the 
production of bad science that falls outside traditional 
understandings of “misconduct.”  
 Expanding the definition of whistleblowing to include 
reports to the media would not be unprecedented.180 Though 
uncommon, there are federal statutes that protect whistleblowers 
that make reports to the media, such as the Federal False Claims 
Act and the whistleblower protections found in the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act.181 The original federal Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989 went even further to permit federal 
employees to report to any person at all.182 Similar provisions in 
state and federal statutes for environmental whistleblowers 
would ensure that more of these whistleblowers are protected 
from discrimination and that they are more able to make news of 
environmental wrongdoing available to the public.183  
                                                        
177. See id. (suggesting that protecting public disclosures would aid 
potential whistleblowers). 
178. See Russo, supra note 3 (discussing the problems faced by 
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179. See Hesch, supra note 45 at 88 (recommending that 
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Likewise, there are statutes that specifically cover 
situations faced by whistleblowing scientists.184 For example, the 
recently passed 2012 Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act 
(“WPEA”) takes steps to protect government scientists from 
scientific censorship.185 Section 110, “Disclosure of Censorship 
Related to Research, Analysis, or Technical Information” defines 
scientific censorship as, “any effort to distort, misrepresent or 
suppress research, analysis or technical information” and 
protects against such censorship when employees reasonably 
believe that it may cause gross government waste or 
mismanagement, that may pose a substantial and specific danger 
to public health or safety, or that constitutes violates the law.186 
By passing the WPEA in fall of 2012, Congress demonstrated 
willingness to actively protect government scientists from 
censorship and to recognize the unique challenges scientists face 
when blowing the whistle. A similar reform to state and federal 
statutes protecting environmental whistleblowers would ensure 
that environmental scientists too are explicitly protected from 
scientific censorship.  
 
3. Insufficient Remedies (State) 
 
 The anti-retaliatory approach is intended to protect 
whistleblowers that go public from retaliation by their 
employers.187 However, current approaches to whistleblowing 
legislation fail to protect whistleblowers from job loss or 
blackballing and to penalize supervisors responsible for engaging 
in retaliatory practices.188 Given that 60% of whistleblowers lost 
                                                                                                                                
protection for media disclosures would be beneficial). 
184. See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. 
L. No. 112-199, § 110, 126 Stat 1465 (providing an example of protections for 
scientists).  
185. See id. (describing how government scientists are afforded 
whistleblower protection).  
186. Id. 
187. See OSHA FACT SHEET, supra note 53 (2013) (outlining worker 
rights when an employer retaliates against the worker for whistleblowing). 
188. See Paul Sullivan, The Price Whistle-Blowers Pay for Secrets, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/your-money/for-
whistle-blowers-consider-the-risks-wealth-matters.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(discussing the consequences whistleblowers are likely to face) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 




their jobs after going public, employment security is a very real 
issue for whistleblowers.189 However, no state statute provides a 
“transfer preference for prevailing whistleblowers or a ban on 
blackballing.”190 Additionally, research shows that positive and 
negative pressures regarding whistleblowing can shape behaviors 
in the workplace.191 However, few states use negative incentives 
to discourage supervisors from engaging in retaliatory practices 
in the first place.192  
State anti-retaliatory statutes should be reformed to 
provide transfer preference for a prevailing whistleblower and/or 
a ban on blackballing. Additionally, these statutes could better 
discourage supervisors from engaging in retaliatory practices by 
providing penalties for managers found to have retaliated.193 
These changes would be especially valuable in the environmental 
sector because they would help address the “revolving door” 
problem that gives industry the power to influence regulators.194 
Indeed, by reducing potential environmental whistleblowers’ 
fears of employment instability, these changes would empower 
public and private employees to speak out against wrongdoing.195 
By increasing potential retaliators’ fears of punishment and 
potential job loss, these statutes would provide a counterbalance 
to the power private interests hold by virtue of the “revolving 
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These types of provisions exist in other laws. The prior 
version of the WPEA, the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,197 
both (1) granted job transfer preference to whistleblowers in 
filling jobs of equivalent status and tenure as the job held by the 
whistleblowing employee and (2) provided for disciplinary actions 
against supervisors. The WPEA did not change the former 
provision, but did strengthen the latter provision by lowering the 
burden of proof.198 Additionally, thirteen state statutes already 
discipline supervisors in some way.199 State statutes ought to be 
modified to better protect whistleblowers and penalize 
retaliators.  
 
4. Statute of Limitations Too Short (Federal) 
 
 The six federal statutes covering environmental 
whistleblowers require whistleblowers to report to the 
Department of Labor (“DOL”) within thirty days of the 
violation.200 This statute of limitations does not give 
whistleblowers enough time to weigh their options and take steps 
to protect themselves.201 Environmental whistleblowers in 
particular would benefit from an extended statute of 
limitations.202 Potential environmental whistleblowers come from 
all walks of life, and many may not be aware of the limited time 
they have to file a complaint or of the procedure for doing so.  
Other statutes have been amended to include a longer 
                                                        
196. See Halpern and Hansel, supra note 194 (defining the 
“revolving door” power struggle faced by environmental whistleblowers). 
197. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, § 
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statute of limitations. The original version of the WPEA, the 
WPA of 1989, expanded the statute of limitations available to 
federal employees to 180 days.203 This reform increased the 
effectiveness of whistleblower laws in protecting federal 
employees.204 There is no reason that federal employees should 
have longer to file a complaint than industry employees, factory 
workers, concerned scientists, reporters, or other environmental 
whistleblowers. Indeed, federal workers are probably more likely 
to know about available protections than industry workers or 
state government representatives because agencies are required 
by law to train their employees in their rights and remedies 
under whistleblower protection laws.205 As such, federal 
environmental statutes should be reformed to provide 





Minnesota looks different thanks to Fardin Oliaei. PCF 
contamination is being cleaned up from waste sites.206 Water 
supplies are being filtered.207 The public is more aware of PCF 
contamination and the risks it poses to Minnesota 
communities.208 Oliaei’s actions protected public health and the 
environment.209 Despite the positive changes she made, Oliaei 
describes the lessons she learned from her experience by saying:  
 
I had intended to make a positive example [for my 
                                                        
203. See id. (noting the increase in the time limit for reporting of 
the WPEA). 
204. See id. (discussing the influence of the burden of proof reform 
of the WPA on other State and Federal regulations). 
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kids and my community]. I wanted to stand up for 
what was right. I wanted to use good science to 
advance the mission of the MPCA: protecting the 
public health and environment. Instead, I 
failed . . . . I took my kids home away. I took their 
security away . . . . With what happened to me, I set 
a negative example for the next generation: if you 
work in a state agency, keep your mouth shut. Stay 
quiet because you are going to be destroyed.210 
 
Her words suggest that she is much like other 
whistleblowers, who would not blow the whistle again if they got 
a “do over.” The reforms proposed in this paper seek to change 
this bleak situation by providing environmental whistleblowers 
with the proper incentives and protections to ensure that they 
would act to protect public health and the environment again and 
again. Such reforms would set a positive example for future 
generations: wherever you work, feel free to speak up and speak 
out because our legal regime will protect and reward you for your 
bravery.  
                                                        
210. See Interview with Fardin Oliaei, supra, note 126 (describing 
the personal feelings of a whistleblower who had to face enormous 
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